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On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic 
Narrativism Theory 
 
Natan Elgabsi and Bennett Gilbert 
In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist 
theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral 
implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral 
vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral 
agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal 
normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and 
intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties 
brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral 
judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic 
narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for 
the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think 
of their theory as a morally responsible one. 
 
 
1. Linguistic narrativism theory and moral life 
 
Is theoretical investigation of the human being separable from explicating a vision of 
human life? If it is inseparable, how do proponents of theoretical perspectives reflect and 
explore the life-visions that they develop and advocate in theory? Usually we think that 
description and evaluation in virtually every type of inquiry are ontologically separable as 
a matter of basic principle. On this principle, both empirical descriptions of states of affairs 
and theoretical descriptions of conceptualized relationships avoid involvement with 
judgements of value, particularly with moral value.1 
Philosopher Iris Murdoch, however, argues that evaluative features stand in any 
description of matters concerning the human being and that these features necessarily 
involve elements not fully explicable through concepts and propositions. Theoretical and 
empirical descriptions of human matters are, as she says, expressions of a certain “vision 
of life.” They therefore commit us to ethical evaluation.2  
Proponents of discursivist or linguistic narrativism theories of culture, such as 
Michel Foucault or Hayden White, would generally agree with Murdoch that descriptions 
and, even more so, narrations necessitate evaluations. White, for example, writes: “The 
important point is that although one can ‘explain’ any worldly phenomenon without 
 
 
1 In this essay we used morality/morals and ethics/ethical interchangeably, with no necessary 
normative distinction between the concepts. 
2 Iris Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy 
and Literature, p. 81; Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Vintage, 2003), pp. 25-
26. 
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assessing a value to it, it is impossible to describe anything without also assessing a value 
or set of values to it.”3 
For both Foucault and White, this means that each person assesses what is “good” 
and “evil” in particular instances of narrated stories on her own evaluative preferences. 
Each person endows each narration, so to speak, with such-and-such ethical or political 
meanings because narratives must always have contemporary ideological force.4 
The difference between Murdoch on the one hand and Foucault and White on the 
other, however, is that for Murdoch the evaluative features of our descriptions or 
narrations do not necessarily express political or ideological sympathies, nor are they 
adequately explained by such sympathies. In her view, ethical evaluations are not 
restricted to the categories of “good” and “evil” but instead involve a range of less strong 
moral concepts that our ordinary decisions in life incorporate. “It is,” she says, “in terms 
of the inner complexity of such concepts that we may display really deep differences of 
moral vision.”5 Thus, in any particular description at hand we will, according to Murdoch, 
have to investigate and understand just what “vision of life”, or “moral vision”, that 
description necessitates or entails. This is less a suspicious, ideology-critical undertaking 
than a close moral understanding of what someone’s words and ideas mean through the 
way they are uttered. 
In this investigation, we start by supporting Murdoch’s notions that theoretical 
descriptions contain degrees of ethical evaluations that express “moral visions” regarding 
what our relationships with other persons ought to be and that the relationship between 
the ideological and the moral is not inescapable. This “moral vision” need not be (and in 
fact seldom is) an articulated part of the theoretical perspective itself, but it can be implied 
through the epistemological (and metaphysical) claims of the theory. In order to concretely 
emphasize the ethically evaluative character of theoretical descriptions, we continue by 
describing the subject of our investigation: a theory that, according to us, forwards 
normatively difficult moral claims. The theory is inspired by the linguistic turn in the 
humanities and may properly be called linguistic narrativism theory, a non-realist theory 
that is prominent within the philosophy of history, to which our work responds.  
Under the linguistic turn, language is regarded as the condition of the possibility 
of both having and making sense of experience. Linguistic narrativism theory takes 
language, rather than any extra-linguistic referents, as the condition of the possibility of 
forming narratives. We hold that it thereby (1) strongly separates meaningfulness and 
judgment on the basis of a supposedly non-phenomenological, epistemic cleavage between 
discourse and the extra-linguistic, factually past and present, reality6; and (2) appeals to 
the moral philosophies of volitionism and intuitionism in order to deal morally with the 
epistemic cleavage it presupposes, and sets for itself. 
 
 
3 Hayden White, The Practical Past (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014), pp. 72–73. 
4 Hayden White, ‘The Public Relevance of Historical Studies: A Reply to Dirk Moses’, History and 
Theory, 44:3 (2005), p. 335; Michel Foucault, ‘The History of Sexuality’, Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 
1980), p. 193. 
5 Iris Murdoch, ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and 
Literature, edited by Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 73. 
6 Kalle Pihlainen, The Work of History: Constructivism and a Politics of the Past (London: Routledge. 
2017), p. xiii; Eugen Zeleňák, ‘Who Should Characterize the Nature of History? The Wrong 
Question?’, Storia della Storiografia 59–60 (2011), pp. 173–174. 
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In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish the two broad kinds of 
narrative theory in the philosophy of history. The first is phenomenological, associated 
with the work of Paul Ricoeur and David Carr, by which the meaningfulness of human life 
has a narrative structure.7 On this account, the horizon of our lives is a coinciding of 
meaning and storytelling, within which explicit moral assessments are a part. The other is 
linguistic narrativism theory as described above. This second type of narrative theory—i.e. 
linguistic narrativism theory—is what we address in this study. 
By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue 
that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral 
agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral 
life. We will show that the theory expresses a “moral vison” that involves, on the one hand, 
an implicit evaluation of what our relationships with other people look like, and on the 
other, an explicit understanding of the character of ethical assessments and moral 
judgments. Thus, even if these higher-order moral commitments are not philosophically 
argued for within linguistic narrativism theory as such, the kinds of normative ethics, as 
explained below, that remain for this and related non-realist theories may, by merciless 
subtraction, stunt the moral aims of their own proponents. In the analysis, we contend that 
the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take 
responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think 
of their theory as a morally responsible one. 
 
 
2. Theoretical description and its moral implications 
 
Amidst the boundaries that some philosophers hold language, or psychic drives, or socio-
economic pressures, or the conservatism of logic to impose, how do we salvage reflection 
on moral life in order to parse out what is good? Murdoch’s concept of “visions” are the 
changing observations, reflections, and conclusion, by which we can work our way 
towards deeper states of moral deliberation and understanding. How one sees the world 
affects how one thinks about it and, by the same logic, how one lives in it; acting and 
thinking connects in what we call moral life. The improvement of vision helps us to 
understand morality better, as well as allowing us to see people in a truer light, improving 
our judgments and choices in the world.8 The process of vision is Murdoch’s move against 
the Humean separation of facts from values in the various forms it took in the post-War 
Anglophone philosophy of her day. It points away from propositionalist concept analysis 
and empirical research and points toward accounts of the dynamic, temporal, and 
historical course that people’s “moral visions” often takes.9 
Before giving a more in-depth description of the “moral vision” of linguistic 
narrativism theory, it is necessary to provide a critique of the customary Humean 
bifurcation of “is” from “ought” and of facts from values that the description/evaluation 
distinction tends to rest on. The distinction seems in some lights to protect values from 
reduction to facts and in other lights fatally expose them to the same disintegrative peril. 
 
 
7 David Carr, Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, volumes 1 and 3, translated by 
Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 1985). 
8 Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, pp. 79–83. 
9 Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 6:1 (2020) 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
This situation of opposing outcomes is the reason that G. E. Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy” 
failed to solve the problem of the status of ethical values that it was intended to solve. If 
values are ontologically other than facts in a profound way, then they are unintelligible in 
terms of facts. In this case they (1) might be senseless as things other than facts and 
intelligible solely as facts about what people believe to be good and bad or (2) are ineffable 
and require discourse, practices, beliefs, or speculation of types wholly outside the domain 
of empirical verification.10 Both results are possible from the is/ought distinction, although 
of course many people rigidly take one side or the other. Nevertheless, thinkers, sometimes 
without being unaware of it, breech, or even reject the fact/value binary, for instance, for 
the reason that when scientists attempt to find moral direction in immanent natural ends, 
their approach requires the surreptitious re-insertion of intuitive, teleological, political, 
religious, or metaphysical claims that subvert the original enterprise.11 
Elizabeth Anscombe attempted to answer some of the difficulties in the ontological 
separation between fact and value. Her examples, derived from David Hume, tell us not 
only that evaluations of what we recognize as relevant to the factuality and truth of a 
situation concerning human states of affairs—such as the evaluative difference between 
“delivering the potatoes” and “supplying me with potatoes”—are intimately connected to 
how we come to frame or describe such states of affairs.12 Her examples also emphasize 
that evaluation in terms of understanding or even judging human matters of fact 
supervenes on the way human states of affairs are described in the first place.13 
Descriptions of human matters—“supplying me with potatoes”—are, one could say, 
already evaluations that lean on what we ordinarily mean when describing such-and-such 
a deed, unless the circumstances are such that one must suspect one means something 
different. That, too, however, is an evaluation—namely a judgement that one should not 
understand the action the way we normally mean. 
This is relevant to our understanding of theoretical perspectives not only because 
evaluative features do not belong exclusively to our descriptions of concrete human state 
of affairs, helping us to recognize what is relevant and not relevant when determining 
facticity and truth in a situation, but also because, as Murdoch argues, different degrees of 
evaluation belong to theoretical or hypothetical descriptions that are systematic 
expressions of a world view. For one could argue that in our life, even when we reiterate a 
theory: “…various values pervade and colour what we take to be the reality of our world; 
wherein we constantly evaluate our own values and those of others, and judge and 
determine forms of consciousness and modes of being.”14 
Theoretical descriptions often express, Murdoch argues, the values of what we take 
to be fundamental relationships or characteristics of our human lifeworld. Theories of 
 
 
10 George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), pp. 10–
14; cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘On Brute Facts’, Ethics, Religion and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers 
Vol. III (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 23. 
11 In philosophy, see Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, pp. 25–26; in philosophy of science, 
see John Dupré, ‘Fact and Value’, Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions, edited by Harold Kincaid, 
John Dupré, and Alison Wylie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 27–41; and in 
discursivist theory of culture, see White, The Practical Past, pp. 72–73. 
12 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being and Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects: Book I-III, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), 
p. 458. 
13 Anscombe, ‘On Brute Facts’, pp. 22–23. 
14 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 26 (italics in original). 
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language, of mind, of ethics, and of culture hinge on predispositions that guide our ideas 
of consciousness or our “modes of being.” Structuralism, one of the principal drives of 
linguistic narrativism theory15, is an example of a world-view that leans on strong ethical 
presuppositions: “Structuralism, in so far as it offers itself as ‘scientific’, must profess to be 
morally neutral; but the large and various volume of structuralist writings contains 
innumerable value judgements.”16 
Structuralism, in which she includes most post-Saussurean theory of language and 
culture, makes strong value-judgements on the concept of “truth” in language, presumed 
as the morally neutral description of language from no particular point of view that posits 
that language in certain ways is estranged from the world it should denote.17 Nevertheless, 
while we will not here inquire into the vision of life that Murdoch’s presentation of 
structuralism entails or presupposes, the perspective we need to take for present purposes 
is that theory is explicated from a certain evaluative point of view in life. “Theory” itself is 
a certain vision of life. It expresses a relationship to the persons with whom we live. 
From Anscombe’s and Murdoch’s claims that different evaluations enter any 
empirical and theoretical description of human states of affairs, we now turn to a 
prominent example of linguistic narrativism theory in order to understand its moral 
implications and the vision of life it professes. In The Ethics of Theory Robert Doran describes 
Hayden White’s prominent theoretical vision of (historical) reality in the following way: 
 
As for relativism, White admits to being a pluralist with regard to the view that no 
single, overreaching perspective on reality or history can claim epistemological 
priority. But this does not thereby render moral judgment impossible or moot. On the 
contrary, moral judgement is returned to the realm of ethical responsibility (choice), 
from which it had become estranged by the supposedly “value-neutral” perspective 
of historical objectivism.18 
 
Doran shows us that White’s vision contains several a priori statements about the 
relationship between, on the one hand epistemology and reality, on the other epistemology 
and ethics. Analysis of this relationship leads us to three insights into linguistic narrativism 
theory: 
(1). Different “perspectives on reality”—i.e., interpretations and narrations based on what 
is factually asserted as true or false by our world-view—cannot have epistemic status 
because they cannot be “subject to epistemological conditions of true and false.”19 White 
himself writes that “the plot-structures used to fashion the different stories are not in 
themselves in the nature of propositions that can be submitted to tests of verification or 
 
 
15  Kalle Pihlainen, ‘The Work of Hayden White II: Defamiliarizing Narrative’, The SAGE Handbook 
of Historical Theory, edited by Nancy Partner and Sarah Foot (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), pp. 121–
123. 
16 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, pp. 46–47. 
17 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, pp. 192–195. One example of linguistic structuralism is 
Roland Barthes, ‘Historical Discourse’, Structuralism: A Reader, edited by Michael Lane, translated 
by Peter Wexler (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 145–155. 
18 Robert Doran, The Ethics of Theory: Philosophy, History, Literature (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing. 2017), p. 123. 
19 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 122. 
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falsification in the way that ‘singular existential statements’ (i.e., facts) can be tested.”20 
Thus, “perspectives on reality,” conditioned by these plot-structures, or forms of story-
telling, cannot be subject to epistemic evaluation as to “epistemological priority.” 
Linguistic narrativism theory holds that only facts— “singular existential statements”—
can be subject to such evaluation. 
This distinction, however, rests on one deeper ontological assumption, or what 
Murdoch called a “mode of being.”21 Doran writes that “of course, on a deeper level, what 
counts as a fact is itself dependent on a priori world-disclosure...in our case that of the 
scientific-naturalist view of the world.”22 In other words, the judgement of what has 
“epistemological priority” (what is factually true and not) belongs not to narrative 
construction but to the deeper ontological stratum of one particular scientific and 
philosophical world-view:  
 
What counted as historical “fact” in medieval Europe was very different from what 
counts as fact in a contemporary context. We no longer permit miracles and witchcraft 
to serve as factual elements in the historical account; they are simply described with 
ironic distance. Thus, in the most general sense, all facts are dependent on a priori 
interpretation.23 
 
Fact, then, refers to one particular vision of the world that conditions everything that we 
take as a state of affairs in our contemporary way of life. To use Bernard Williams’ terms, 
one could say that the medieval fact of miracles and witchcraft is not factually “possible” 
in our world governed by the scientific-naturalist world-view.24 This idea of the 
relationship between epistemology and reality, or in actual fact between epistemology and 
“perspectives on reality,” has implications also for the relationship between epistemology 
and ethics. That consequence may be put as follows.  
(2). The theory pursues the claim that what is epistemically true or false on the 
naturalist estimation is an epistemic judgment that is “subject to epistemological 
conditions of true and false.”25 Thus, fact is not a matter of ethical choice or interpretation; 
moral judgements typically belong to the practical construction of a story, which stipulates 
what is contextually true and false, aesthetically beautiful, or politically or ideologically 
effective. In other words, epistemology (with its epistemic judgments about states of 
affairs) is categorically separated from the realm of ethics (with its moral judgements about 
how one should arrange and understand these states of affairs). 
There is, however, also a third result that is important for understanding the nature 
of linguistic narrativism theory. 
(3). In this theory ethics is itself fundamentally envisioned as volitionism, that is to 
say, as a matter of making present choices on individual intuitions and preferences.26 The 
 
 
20 Hayden White, ’Historical Pluralism and Pantextualism’, The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on 
History, Literature, and Theory 1957-2007, edited by Robert Doran (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010), p. 232; cf. Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 122. 
21 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 26. 
22 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 122 (italics in original). 
23 ibid. 
24 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), pp.  139–140, 142. 
25 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 122. 
26 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, translated by Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), pp. 23–28. 
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naturalist’s assertion of fact is, in this respect, not subject to an ethical choice (a moral 
judgment) even if he describes facts (states of affairs). Facts are not evaluated on ethical 
decisions but are instead conditioned by what is epistemically true and false according to 
the naturalist world-view. The human scientist, by contrast, is inherently subject to an 
ethical choice, because any emplotment of story (even if it refers to states of affairs) is 
inevitably made on moral preferences. The story is written in the human scientist’s ethical 
decisions. 
The point of looking at linguistic narrativism theory in this way is to show what 
“vision of life,” or “moral vison,” it expresses.27 On this description, Doran even argues 
that the theory involves strong categorical presuppositions that should be treated 
analogously to the categories in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Thus, to say that 
linguistic narrativism theoretically legitimizes immoral histories, is “like asking if the Nazi 
also perceives the world according to the categories of the understanding and the forms of 
intuition as outlined in Kant’s first Critique. From a metahistorical perspective, emplotment 
is simply what every historian does, Nazi or not.”28 This is where ethical tensions tend to 
arise. A generous reading of this idea would imply that theoretical legitimation of narrative 
work as simply the categorical forms that any writing of narrative as well as scholarly 
description of such work must take are quite different things from judging what that work 
morally means. This must mean that the author’s epistemic responsibility is (exactly as a 
positivist or empiricist would claim) tied to being true to the asserted facts, whereas her 
moral responsibility is tied to the moral consequence of what her emplotted narrative may 
play out to mean in the present. The question is, however, against what normative 
background one is to judge whether an author is true to the things she claims, both 
epistemically and morally? 
What distresses the “moral vision” to which linguistic narrativism theory can lead 
is the fact that descriptions of the mere nature of narrative can theoretically legitimize 
immoral narratives by virtue of describing only what anyone does when writing narrative. 
This entails that one will not be able to distinguish a theoretical description of the fact that 
such-and-such a narrative is undertaken from the agnostic or morally relativistic response 
to the fact that such-and-such a narrative is undertaken but not responded to as immoral. 
In that way the moral idleness of linguistic narrativism theory challenges Doran’s own, or 
anyone’s, claim that the existential and philosophical underpinnings of this kind of 
discursive cultural theory should be understood purely as “epistemological relativism” 
and not as an agnostic form of “moral relativism.”29 Nevertheless, on the assumption that 
this theoretical approach itself does not entail morally agnostic visions of life and that it 
should not do so, because one needs to distinguish theoretical description from moral 
response, moral agnosticism announces itself also in yet another sense. From the viewpoint 
of a writer of a narrative herself, in order not to provide justification for her own possible 
agnosticism or immorality, linguistic narrativism theory would need a normativity that is 
not bound to the intuitions and choices of the author herself. We will argue that it is not 
possible to establish this moral normativity by the means of Doran’s and White’s volitional 
 
 
27 Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, p. 81; Murdoch, ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, p. 73. 
28 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 119; see also Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, History 
and Theory, 43:4 (2004), pp. 75–76; and her History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools 
of Thought (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 94. 
29 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 119. 
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choice-ethics insofar as volitional ethics has only the resources of moral intuitionism by 
which to justify or deliberate moral claims. 
 
 
3. Moral vision, volition, and intuition in linguistic narrativism theory 
 
Even if linguistic narrativism theory is constructivist and non-realist in nature, its 
proponents take on a normative stance derived from moral intuitionism and volitionism 
regarding ethical matters—a stance that may arguably involve a sense of “realism.” This 
may sound like a contradiction. As a meta-ethical theory, intuitionism, as in G. E. Moore’s 
thought, is a form of “moral realism.”30 Our question, however, is how proponents of 
linguistic narrativism theory think of the “reality” that their moral judgements are 
supposed to be grounded in; furthermore, what “moral vision” does linguistic narrativism 
theory that appeals to the normativity of moral intuitionist and volitionist theses imply? 
In this regard, although volitionism is sometimes used as a descriptive meta-
ethical or “psychological” thesis whilst intuition is assigned to carry out the normative 
task, we use both terms chiefly to name prescriptive theses, although they both do some 
descriptive work as well.31 On the one hand, this is because proponents of linguistic 
narrativism theory seldom themselves know whether they move on a meta-ethical or 
normative level. And on the other hand, as Murdoch argues, since all the objects of meta-
ethical theory are normative ideas, it is difficult even in theory to empty the moral concepts 
from their evaluative content.32 
Volitionism holds that it is justifiable to assign values and to make consequential 
choices on the basis of will, and according to one’s interests or emotions, without strictly 
requiring evidentiary or philosophical reasons for the sake of moral responsibility.33 
Intuitionism (though the term sometimes also refers to psychological states or 
mechanisms) holds that assigning values and making consequential choices are sufficiently 
justified by intuitions because intuitions are direct cognition of right and wrong in so far as 
humans can possibly know what is right and what is wrong.34 The important prescriptive 
purchase of the two approaches is that they provide what our moral judgements should be 
or, at the least, must be, since they are never anything else. 
Regardless of whether we refer to the existentialist “doctrine”35 or to the naturalist 
“psychology”36 of volitionism and intuitionism, they both connect intimately to linguistic 
narrativism theory because it, in its canonical form, holds that the use of discourse 
constitutes our individual imaginative acts of enunciation and is not “epiphenomenal” to 
 
 
30 For a discussion of how Moore’s “moral realism” in Prinicipia Ethica can be understood, see 
Camilla Kronqvist, ‘Westermarck and Moore on the Sources of Morality’, Evolution, Human 
Behaviour and Morality: The Legacy of Westermarck, edited by Olli Lagerspetz, Jan Antfolk, Ylva 
Gustafsson and Camilla Kronqvist (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 129–141. 
31 Pascal Engel, ‘Volition and Voluntarism About Belief’, Belief, Cognition and the Will, edited by A. 
Meijers (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. 1999), pp. 9–25.  
32 Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, pp. 80–82. 
33 Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, pp. 23–32; cf. Roland Barthes, Empire of Signs, translated by 
Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 69–71. 
34 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 184–
197. 
35 Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, pp. 18–20. 
36 Brian Leiter, ‘Normativity for Naturalists’, Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs, 25:1 (2015), 
pp.  64–66. 
De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 6:1 (2020) 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
some other “reality” or some other human activity, including the classically humanistic 
subject or self.37 It argues that analysis pursuant to this idea unsettles habit and undermines 
convention.38 Kalle Pihlainen has emphasized the way this insures our taking moral 
responsibility away from the spurious authority of an empirically unavailable reality and 
onto one’s self.39 
In Pihlainen’s terms, proponents of linguistic narrativism theory often want to 
actualize the emancipatory possibilities of theoretical reflection by thinking of language as 
performative acts and by not relying on the authority of “the reality of the past.”40 With 
this intention, although the scholar in one sense frees herself, she has also limited herself 
to her own sentiments and choices in the absence of “facts.” She may well proceed beyond 
those choices through analysis, but what activates the impulse to do so? Although the 
theory itself, as Doran suggests, does not necessarily entail agnostic forms of “moral 
relativism,”41 the scholar’s volition nonetheless faces toward her own self and toward the 
self’s intuitions if she has no other subject of moral inquiry to which she must be 
responsible. In that case, her preferred prejudices, or habits, or contemporary conventions 
take over—a result exactly the opposite of that which post-modernist approaches to 
understanding the world are supposed to yield.42 The reason for this reversal lies in the 
ambiguous character of moral volition and intuition to which this kind of thinking resorts 
in default of any transcendental ground for judgment. 
The fundamental tension as to what constitutes the normative ground for moral 
judgement in linguistic narrativism theory can be exemplified by a statement of Hayden 
White’s. He writes: “…the ethical opens up a space in which ‘something has to be done’. 
This is quite different from morality that, on the basis of some dogmatism, insists on telling 
us what we must and must not do in a given situation of choice.”43 
White tries to save the ethical responsiveness of moral agents by the distinction 
between a supposedly non-normative concept of “ethics” and a normative concept of 
“morality.” Hence, if only the person herself can demand what she “must and must not 
do” with regard to her own action in a volitional situation, it strongly infers that 
normativity is not a supra-personal or transcendental “moral” demand but a matter of 
personal (what he calls “ethical”) sentiment. On this view, demands on the moral agent are 
thought to be intuitively instilled on whatever principles or sentiments the moral agent 
herself happen to ethically appeal to (e.g., what she desires or chooses). 
The difficulty of this vision is that recognizing “a space in which something has to 
be done” is not a non-normative claim. Instead, it is a normative one in two important 
senses: (1) it is normative because it proclaims that one should recognize a space as “ethical” 
(and not, say, as mechanical or natural)—a space in which one knows that one’s actions 
will be judged morally by others in a human life-world; and (2) it is  normative because it 
 
 
37 Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representational Time 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 116–119; cf. Barthes, Empire of Signs, p. 70. 
38 Ermarth Sequel to History, pp. 41–44. 
39 Pihlanen, The Work of History, pp. 48–51. 
40 Pihlainen, The Work of History, pp. 92–93. 
41 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 119. 
42 Pihlainen, The Work of History, p. xvii; cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1995), pp. 31–34. 
43 White, ‘The Public Relevance of Historical Studies’, p. 338 (italics in original); cf. Michel Foucault, 
‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, The Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984: Vol I, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), p 263. 
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stipulates that one actually must do something in this “ethical” space of moral agency—thus, 
one must do not just anything but must do that which belongs to being a moral agent in a 
human lifeworld. Therefore, to critique the normativity of what is called “morality”—
moral prescriptions about what we “must and must not do”—is not necessarily to 
undermine the normativity of what is called “ethics,” to wit, that certain things (and not 
just anything) have to be done in certain situations given that we act with other people. In 
truth, even for White, to break with the first dogma already seems to presuppose the 
mandate of the second one. 
The source of the paradox or tension in this vision is that “ethics” put normatively 
as “a space in which something has to be done” itself subverts the very possibility that 
normativity of moral intuition can be intuitively instilled.44 The reason for this 
undermining is that, on this account, even if one thinks that the normativity of what exactly 
should be done in the “ethical” space is a personal, sensible, and volitional act (of 
enunciation) with no supra-personal or transcendental backgrounds, it is nowhere denied 
that “ethics” and “morality” are meaningful solely in being and acting for another. To 
recognize this, however, is already in important senses to relate to a supra-personal 
demand. In other words, if “ethics” is the “space in which something has to be done”, it 
cannot possibly be instilled on my own sentiment, even if my sentiment may be my 
response. This exact thought reveals the tension in White’s thinking. 
Thus, from the tension within White’s vison, we submit that linguistic narrativism 
theory invites two categorically different ways to take on what we, despite White’s 
distinction, synonymously call ethics or morality. (1) It can either take the route that any 
talk about “ethics” and “morality” in linguistic narrativism theory presupposes a supra-
personal human lifeworld against which the actions of the moral agent are judged on a 
normativity that is not instilled by the agent herself. Or (2) it can take the route of denial of 
any meaningful talk about normativity altogether (thus any meaningful talk about “ethics” 
and “morality”), falling into a morally agnostic description of “ethics” as textual code, or 
at worst solipsism. 
Within the theoretical cluster of linguistic narrativism theory, Pihlainen is the one 
scholar who most strongly emphasizes the importance of the first of these two alternatives. 
He argues that any reasonable vision of morality cannot in theory overlook the fact that it 
constitutes a relationship to other real people. Regarding non-fiction, we are, he says, 
steadily reminded that:  
 
…historical narratives represent particular real people. Rather than always appropriate 
texts to our own personal concerns and particular points of view, we can thus at least 
aspire to another kind of understanding. As authors of historical accounts we are 
similarly reminded of our responsibilities in representing others, thus perhaps 
becoming better aware of the difficulties involved in understanding those who are 
different to ourselves.45 
 
Despite the possible difficulties of understanding other people, the relationship to others 
prevents linguistic narrativism theory from falling into descriptive moral agnosticism or 
 
 
44 See this tension in Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, 23–26; and Keith Jenkins, ‘The End of the 
Affair: On the Irretrievable Breakdown of History and Ethics’, Rethinking History, 11:2 (2007), p. 283. 
45 Kalle Pihlainen, ‘The Moral of the Historical Story: Textual Differences in Fact and Fiction’, New 
Literary History, 33:1 (2002), pp. 56–57 (italics in original). 
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solipsism because of the normative demands that the existence of other “particular real 
people” force on us. Even in narrative construction, other people limit our actions and 
choices by being those for whom we are responsible. This is, indeed, the normativity that 
we contend proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must more carefully explicate and 
recognize in order to avoid the claim that the normativity of moral intuition is intuitively 
instilled on the agent’s own performative acts.46 
Nevertheless, for proponents of the second vision, such as Elizabeth Deeds 
Ermarth, “ethics” should be understood as a “multiplicity of…semantic systems,” or 
“codes,” whereas it seems to lack its normative relation to the other.47 Therefore, she argues 
that in the discursive condition “…thought cannot linger long on an ‘ethics’ of ‘good’ or 
‘should’ because adequacy involves qualities of enunciation: such as degrees of originality, 
proportion, flexibility (play), complexity, completeness.”48 
It may be true that moral assessment requires these heterogeneous qualities of the 
individual. Our argument, however, is that it is doubtful that any meaningful “conception 
of individual responsibility” survives if normativity is anchored in intuitive individual acts 
of “enunciation.” If “ethics” is re-described as a set of textual “codes,” and if “only 
enunciation adds value” to our preferring one “code” over another, while at the same time 
our moral compass cannot concern any transcendental “good” or “ought” responding to 
the demands that the existence of other persons put on us, one would have to conclude 
that normativity is instilled by the individual herself or ultimately that it is undone as 
senseless.49 In the following section, we will consider more closely what moral implications 
that theoretical route may entail. 
 
4. Difficulties of intuitively instilled normativity 
 
One imperative principle of moral intuitionism is, as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong puts it, the 
“claim that some moral believers are justified in believing some moral claims 
independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from any other 
beliefs.”50 Moral intuitions are conceived as direct truths requiring no other moral 
substantiation. Advocates of moral intuitionism often suggest that as a practical matter 
intuition sufficiently supplies moral principles. In the case of the moral intuitionism 
attached to linguistic narrativism theory, proponents, such as Foucault (or Ermarth), 
confine themselves to problematizing the structure of moral justifications through 
discourse analysis of texts (and sometimes other media, such as paintings) of historical 
interest. The subjectively problematized history, or “genealogy,” then, is reality as it is 
intuited or seen—and indeed it is very much a reality, a true understanding of the real 
things in human behavior, especially the cracks in our reasoning that we cover up—but it 
 
 
46 Émmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media), p. 10; Anton Froeyman, ‘Never the Twain Shall 
Meet? How Narrativism and Experience can be Reconciled by Dialogical Ethics’, History and Theory, 
54:2 (2015), pp. 162–177.  
47 Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition, pp. 94–95; Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 75–76; 
cf. Barthes, Empire of Signs, pp. 63–68. 
48 Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition, p. 95; cf. Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, p. 76. 
49 All quotes from Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition, pp. 94-95; Ermarth, ‘Ethics and 
Method’, pp. 75–76; cf. Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, pp. 67–69. 
50 Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, pp. 188–189; cf. Moore, Prinicipia Ethica, pp. 143–144. 
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is also generally the circumference of the real that is analyzed.51 Thus, reality (be it 
“historical reality” or “morality”) cannot on this account be grounded in moral reasoning, 
but can only be discursively appealed to by a subjectively enacted imagination related to 
an intuited politics of the present52; and so from a philosophical point of view, meta-ethical 
intuitionism or volitionism is tacitly accepted. 
The chief advantage of this idea is that if it is correct it unburdens us of much of 
the effort to find axiomatic first principles for morality. This approach charms some 
proponents of linguistic narrativism theory because it helps in eluding the hard problems 
incident to piloting a normative system between notions of inward and outward, 
individual and social, rationalist and emotional, and empirical and evaluative.53 Thus, 
when moral knowledge is granted validity or esteem because it is emergent from natural 
knowledge or continuous with it, rather than meaningless, or when one agrees with pure 
intuitionism on the plain good sense of not using old metaphysical and epistemological 
conundrums to dismiss the human activity of evaluation, what is allowed is a comfortable 
way to rely on a supposedly direct relation to the empirical or natural external world—or 
even an unreflective path to moral truth—for ethical guidance. 
What, then, is regarded as instilling normativity in moral intuitions? First, it arises 
from the idea that intuitive judgments are conceived as quick ones. If we look at what we 
are told is a painting of a lemon, we can readily agree or deny that it is a lemon because we 
are familiar enough with lemons to tell at a glance. Were we less familiar with lemons, we 
would look more closely, maybe use a loop, and perhaps bring along a botanical field 
guide. Second, what enables this idea of judgements to be consonant with moral judgements 
is the supposition that “common sense” morality has survived because it is trustworthy.54 
Because common sense may be quick, it can provide sufficient directly intuited knowledge; 
its status as knowledge (justified true belief) is conferred by its longevity and its handy 
celerity. The “self-evidence” to which moral intuitionists restrict moral knowledge is as 
instantaneous as perception, unless other conditions, such as consistency or conformity to 
consensus, are added. However, when consistency or conformity are added to intuitions, 
the resulting moral claims are in fact no longer grounded on intuition.  
Nevertheless, the view that our beliefs about right and wrong do not have any 
ground other than intuition commits theory that relies on intuition to the position that 
unless the justification of moral statements is itself intuitive, discussions of morality are 
undermined by the post-modern anti-foundationalist analysis of discourse.55 Thus, it is 
necessary for the defenders to offer this disjunction: either moral knowledge is intuitive, 
or there is no normativity. However, on this logic, the only supposed justification for 
normativity would be the normativity with which moral psychology, or common sense, is 
credited by virtue of its intuitivity.56 This leads to a syllogistic error: moral knowledge can 
be intuitive and there can be normativity; but these two premises do not add up to a valid 
conclusion about anything. Nothing, in fact, requires moral knowledge to be intuitive, or 
 
 
51 Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’, pp. 262–269; Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 73–78. 
52 Foucault, ‘The History of Sexuality’, p. 193; cf. Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 75–76. 
53 E.g., Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition; Barthes, Empire of Signs. 
54 It needs to be noted that “common sense” is also sometimes critiqued for being a morality of 
prudence. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, translated by Annette Lavers (New York: The Noonday 
Press, 1972), pp. 32–34. 
55 Cf. Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 61–83; Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition; cf. 
Jenkins, ‘The End of the Affair’, pp. 275–285, Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 28–31. 
56 Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, pp. 187–192. 
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normativity to be instilled therein. Even if this were the case, it cannot be made a matter of 
necessity, especially not on the naturalistic syllogism that it must be true because certain 
pieces of natural (or moral-psychological) knowledge are true.57 
Thus, from the gap between intuitive knowledge and natural properties arises the 
naturalist’s skeptical position as to moral claims. It is for the consistent naturalist as it is for 
the linguistic narrativist who appeals to that vision: normativity ceases to “exist” because 
it is claimed to be unsubstantiated as a natural (factual) “property.”58 Furthermore, the 
presentation of moral claims is sometimes conceived to be advocacy or rejection of 
feelings,59 not facts as to what does and does not suffice in the world when we respond to 
other people in our lives. The difficulty of this vision is that if proponents of intuitionism 
claim that “deontic or normative properties” are always “related to reasons” and also reject 
such reasons and their “properties,” it suggests that normativity, even when described as 
a deontic matter, is framed as (1) a property or object and (2) a particular that should 
determine what justifies one’s moral beliefs.60 On the contrary, what is unique about the 
normative relationship we have to other people is not that it is best understood as a 
property, nor that it should justify one’s own actions, nor that our relationship to others 
requires justification.61 For one could claim that anyone’s and everyone’s moral agency, 
regardless of whether it is intuitive or reasoned, already constitutes a normative 
relationship with other persons that no skeptical regress can obliterate without then 
invoking moral nihilism as to other real people and beings.62 
Prudence supports logic here in rejecting intuitionism: under moral intuitionism, 
what has already been learned, or is quickly conceived, would have to differ with regard 
to normativity from what is yet to be learned or more slowly conceived. This is a difficult 
way to approach moral reflection, because, as Sinnott-Armstrong claims, such intuitive 
particularism may justify the possibility of “moral nihilism” as a qualified take on 
morality.63 The supposedly normative force of the quickness and particularity of moral 
judgment is thereby an assertion by which moral intuitionism enables an indifference to 
recognizing the world of laboring, struggling humankind, just because a person is 
comfortable with herself and her own intuitions, instead of asking herself how her own 
intuitions possibly disable her to responsibly care for others. Were we to follow this way 
of moral thinking, not only in accepting immediate understanding but also in hanging onto 
our received notions, we must be like Prince Oblonsky in Anna Karenina, whose: 
 
...tendencies and opinions were not his by deliberate choice: they came of themselves, 
just as he did not choose the fashion of his hats or coats but wore those of the current 
style. Living in a certain social set, and having a desire, such as generally develops 
with maturity, for some kind of mental activity, he was obliged to hold views, just as 
he was obliged to have a hat.... Thus [his views] became habitual to Oblonsky, and he 
 
 
57 Cf. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 10–14; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, in 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, edited Mary J. Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 90–91. 
58 In line with naturalism, linguistic narrativism theory argues that fact is determined by a 
naturalist-scientific worldview. Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 122. 
59 Leiter, ‘Normativity for Naturalists’, p. 74. 
60 Leiter, ‘Normativity for Naturalists’, p. 65; Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, pp. 189–192. 
61 Cf. Kant, Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 86, 90–91. 
62 Cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, p. 167. 
63 Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms, p. 191. 
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loved his paper as he loved his after-dinner cigar, for the light mistiness it produced 
in his brain.64 
 
The distinction between the most upright and impartialist intuition and the smugness of a 
rich prince or plutocrat is thinner than one thinks at a quick glance. And it is a fair bet that 
intuitionism underestimates the scrutiny to which people put their moral opinions or the 
percentage of people who put their morality under high scrutiny. Whether verbal and 
educated or not, people feel very deeply, such that they look for the moral good in what 
they do. Everything will come into question in life as it is actually lived with others. 
If the force of our ratiocinative, affective, and even unconscious ways of living 
morally responsible lives is so evacuated by the scepticist critique that moral deliberation 
and normativity are deflated to intuition, then we are mistakenly purging some of the 
visions, ideas, and stories that enable us to be moral agents and to renew that agency in the 
first place. While critique valuably leads us to de-stabilize and complicate the stories and 
discourses comprising our “moral visions”, we must necessarily rethink those human 
relationships and discursive reflections on life that enable us to have a “moral vision” at all. 
Even if intellect complicates and might erase the meaningfulness of narrative, even if this 
erasure and uncertainty of meaningfulness is our intuition, we must ask whether that 
intuition is true to the other beings we answer to. That moral understanding requires 
reflective thought about our responsibilities through experiential and deliberative 
temporal depth of our “moral vision” where our relationship with others is a 
presupposition and not itself a choice. 
The proponent of linguistic narrativism theory may well readily admit this. 
However, if she nonetheless relies on intuition and nonetheless does not return to that 
meaningfulness of actions that grows quite separately from personal will and from the 
automatism of materially willed or desired actions, then she has not understood the moral 
or immoral meaning of her own “moral vision” implicated in the theory she pursues. In 
order to retake responsibility, as linguistic narrativism theory claims to do65, she must 
consider the moral responsiveness of moving beyond volition and/or intuition in the light 
of what it normatively means to be with and to care for other persons.66 Without this self-
reflection, the proponent of linguistic narrativism theory will, again, end up in the morally 
agnostic loop of re-confirming the correctness and goodness of her own intuitions on her 
own intuitions. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Whether or not one regards moral volitionism and moral intuitionism as two different 
roads that linguistic narrativism theory can take, its proponents must still engage the really 
hard problem of aligning a forceful and humane way to understand how the theory affects 
people and their relationships to one another. In other words, even if it is claimed that 
moral volition and intuition should be able to lead proponents of linguistic narrativism 
theory back to reference to “reality,”67 the position does not escape ethical evaluation and 
 
 
64 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, translated by L. and A. Maude (New York: Knopf, 1999), pp. 7–8. 
65 Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 75–76. 
66 Cf. Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, pp. 87–89. 
67 Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, pp. 75–76; Barthes, ‘Historical Discourse’, pp. 153–155. 
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reproach. Our analysis shows that the position clearly consolidates, rather than liquidates, 
the gap between facts and values and invites moral skepticism. As a “moral vision,”68 it 
leaves not only the agent’s personal sentiments and choices, but also her normative 
commitments, up to individual will and intuition, on the epistemic presumption of an 
empirically unavailable “reality” and on the ethical presumption of the unavoidable 
subjectivity and freedom of judgment.69 
However, if what makes theoretical description different from an index of facts or 
causes or from a fairy-tale is that it helps us step into intimate, ethical connections with 
other persons, then these people themselves cannot be the product of subjective will or 
intuition. Pihlainen suggests that if theory-based accounts are not to become 
“entertainment” or to stay trapped in a “dead in the water fact-fiction debate,” one must 
turn to “experientiality and emotional impact” in order to envision right action.70  
In other words, one may reasonably hold that non-referentiality and non-realism 
makes exploration of experience and emotion in moral life possible, but only with a certain 
normative preunderstanding. As Georges Didi-Huberman has argued (in a line of thought 
descending chiefly from Aby Warburg and Walter Benjamin), not only do personal 
accounts and the testimony of memory not need “a clearly visible...referent,” but also the 
very absence of the referent in a verbal or even visual account of past experience can 
enhance its affective power.71 Passing-away and loss outline the notion of the past, and 
what is represented must be at the least what is no longer unequivocally intelligible 
through reference.72 The moral philosophical insight, however, is that even if the referent 
is fragmentary, there is no theoretical reason for us to deviate from the normative 
preunderstanding that even in theoretical reflection we relate to “particular real people.”73 
In this investigation, we have contended that linguistic narrativism theory needs 
to rethink the moral implications of its presuppositions and claims in order not to justify 
morally agnostic “moral visions.” Relying on Murdoch’s philosophical insight that 
theoretical descriptions involve degrees of ethical evaluation and express a “moral vision,” 
we have contended that scholars who forward theoretical perspectives, such as linguistic 
narrativism theory, in the end cannot elide relationships to other real people. Our 
normative contention is that in so far as the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory 
want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one, they must clearly recognize the 
moral implications of the theory and take responsibility for those implications, accordingly 
to the kind of “moral vision” their theory professes. Exactly as there is never a result in 
consciousness that floats entirely away from reflection, like a helium balloon flying up 
from earth when its ropes are cut, there is no theoretical inquiry about ethics and 
responsibility without the face of the other. 
     
 
 
68 Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, pp. 82–87. 
69 Doran, The Ethics of Theory, p. 119; Ermarth, ‘Ethics and Method’, p. 79; White, ‘Historical 
Pluralism and Pantextualism’, pp. 230–236; see also White, ‘The Public Relevance of Historical 
Studies’, p. 338. 
70 Pihlainen, The Work of History, pp. 29–30. 
71 Georges Didi-Huberman, Bark, translated by Samuel E. Martin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
2017), p. 81. 
72 Edith Wyschogrod, The Ethics of Remembering (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 
20–22. 
73 Pihlainen, ‘The Moral of the Historical Story’, p. 56; Bennett Gilbert, A Personalist Philosophy of 
History (New York: Routledge, 2019). 
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